An Economic Reading of Power, Flows, and Fractures in Global Food Markets
A disturbing fact: producing more, feeding less well
The most disturbing fact is not that the world is hungry. The most disturbing fact is that it is hungry at a moment when it has never produced more. According to the FAO, global cereal production reached a record level in 2025, around 3.029 billion tonnes, driven in particular by maize and rice; global rice production alone is projected at 563.4 million tonnes (milled basis) for 2025/26, also a record. At the same time, the FAO estimates that in 2024 approximately 673 million people still suffered from hunger, representing 8.2% of the global population. In other words: the central issue is no longer simply the quantity produced, but the architecture that determines where food goes, at what price, and for whom.
This changes everything. Contemporary hunger is no longer merely the shadow of poor harvests; it is the consequence of a system that is extraordinarily optimized, but optimized for the fluidity of capital and value chains, not for universal access. The SOFI 2025 highlights this from another angle: the average cost of a healthy diet reached $4.46 (PPP) per person per day in 2024, and 2.6 billion people could not afford such a diet. Production is therefore increasing faster than access equity. This is the economy of hunger: a world where global supply expands while nutritional accessibility remains fractured.
A mosaic of markets, not a single system
The most comforting illusion is to believe that a global food market operates as a vast rational adjustment mechanism. In reality, it is a mosaic of hierarchized markets. Wheat and maize have a genuinely global reach; rice, by contrast, feeds populations more directly but circulates far less freely. The FAO projects international rice trade at 60.5 million tonnes in 2025, a historic record, but this remains modest relative to total production: rice therefore remains far more sovereign than global. This distinction is decisive. When India alters its export policy, it is not merely a commercial event: it is an act of food power. In this sector, sovereignty can outweigh competitiveness.
Water: the invisible factor already shaping the future
It is necessary to address water, because any serious reflection on the future of global food systems that ignores water overlooks the physical foundation of the economy. Agriculture accounts for approximately 70% of global freshwater withdrawals, and this is not merely an environmental parameter: it is the variable that will determine the future hierarchy between crops, territories, and uses. In Europe, according to the European Environment Agency, water scarcity affected 28% of EU territory in 2023 for at least one season, with particularly structural conditions in the southern regions, where agriculture, drinking water, and tourism simultaneously exert pressure on resources. This means that the European agricultural debate no longer concerns only yields or income; it concerns the trade-off between food security, water sustainability, and regional specialization.
The European Union: an agricultural power under structural strain
From Brussels or Paris, the European Union continues to appear as a major agricultural power. It is. Eurostat indicates that in 2024 the EU produced approximately 258 million tonnes of cereals, 162 million tonnes of raw milk, and 21 million tonnes of pig meat. In the same year, the EU harvested 62.2 million tonnes of fresh vegetables and 24.3 million tonnes of fruits, berries, and nuts; Spain, Italy, and France dominate vegetable production, while Italy, Spain, and Poland dominate fruit production. Yet this power is more fragile than it appears: it relies on imported inputs, expensive energy, pressured farm structures, and specialization that exposes orchards, horticulture, and olive production to climate shocks. The European Commission itself acknowledges that the coming decade will be marked by low productivity growth, high costs, and a transition toward more sustainable systems. The EU therefore remains powerful, but less sovereign than it assumes.
Real centralization: who controls food systems
This is where real centralization emerges. Food markets are not merely influenced by “the market” in an abstract sense; they are organized by actors who control seeds, inputs, trading, processing, logistics, and sometimes retail access. The OECD has noted for several years that real agri-food value chains bear little resemblance to the theoretical model of perfect competition: they are shaped by concentration, differentiation, vertical integration, and bargaining power. In seeds, consolidation has intensified through mergers. In agricultural trading, the UNCTAD highlighted as recently as late 2025 the role of highly concentrated trading houses, particularly the major grain companies, which operate both as physical and financial intermediaries. The consequence is not necessarily “manipulation” in a legal sense; it is often more structural: a capacity to influence flows, price formation, storage, and the speed at which shocks are transmitted.
Oils and sugar: markets where everything shifts rapidly
Cereals remain the caloric core of the system, but they no longer alone determine its instability. Vegetable oils, for instance, have become one of the key pressure points of the global food system because they sit at the intersection of food, biofuels, and industrial demand. The FAO shows that between May and October 2025, its vegetable oil price index rose by 11.3%, reaching its highest level since July 2022, driven by palm oil, Indonesian biodiesel, Black Sea sunflower oil, and European rapeseed. Here, future hunger is also shaped by energy policies: when an oil feeds both the plate and the fuel tank, the competition is no longer agricultural, it becomes macroeconomic.
Sugar tells another kind of story. It is one of the markets most sensitive to rapid shifts in perception, tropical climate conditions, and consumption patterns. The FAO noted that between May and October 2025, its sugar price index fell by 14%, reaching its lowest level since December 2020, due to expectations of abundant supply. At first glance, this appears positive. In reality, it highlights that abundance in one segment does not resolve imbalances across the food system: sugar may become more accessible while fruits, dairy, oils, or animal proteins remain out of reach for the most vulnerable populations.
Fruits and vegetables: the global nutritional divide
Fruits and vegetables are often treated as a public health issue, whereas they are also a geopolitical one. The WHO recommends at least 400 grams per day, yet the challenge is not only nutritional education: it is price, storage, logistics, urbanization, and climate vulnerability of labor-intensive and water-intensive production systems. In the EU, 2024 saw a rebound in vegetable production to 62.2 million tonnes, while fruit production declined to 24.3 million tonnes (excluding citrus, grapes, and strawberries). Globally, the FAO emphasizes that fruits and vegetables are essential to health, yet their economic accessibility remains fragile in many regions. The global system continues to secure tradable commodities more effectively than fresh foods that determine nutritional quality.
Proteins, fisheries, and aquaculture: a structural transformation
Meat and dairy reflect a stratification by income. Growth in global meat consumption is concentrated in middle-income countries, while poorer populations remain below recommended nutritional thresholds. The FAO noted in November 2025 an annual increase in meat and dairy prices, despite short-term adjustments. This is not a uniform transition but a hierarchy of diets.
Fisheries and aquaculture tell another story. The FAO indicates that global production reached 223.2 million tonnes in 2022, with aquaculture now clearly dominant. This shift marks a transition from extraction to production. But it raises a fundamental question: who will access these new protein sources?
Coffee and cocoa: global value, local vulnerability
Coffee and cocoa demonstrate that value does not guarantee equity. Despite very high prices (cocoa exceeding $8,000 per tonne in 2025) producers remain exposed to volatility and capture only a limited share of value. These markets concentrate climate risks, financial dynamics, and historical legacies. The higher the value, the more asymmetric its distribution becomes.
Nutraceuticals: the silent transformation of agriculture
Nutraceuticals reveal a deeper transformation. Omega-3, protein isolates, botanical extracts, these markets are capturing an increasing share of agricultural and marine resources. When biomass becomes an input for high-value products, the primary function of feeding competes with margin optimization. Agriculture is no longer only about feeding populations, but increasingly about producing ingredients.
Inputs and energy: the true center of gravity
The food system is now inseparable from energy. Fertilizer costs, closely linked to gas, directly influence yields. In 2026, certain tensions triggered a 30-40% increase in urea prices. Such shocks propagate immediately throughout the system. Agriculture now depends as much on energy markets as on climate.
At 10 years: apparent stability, real fragility
Projections to 2034 indicate controlled growth in production and relative price stability. Yet these projections rest on an implicit assumption: the absence of major shocks. In reality, risks are accumulating (climatic, hydric, geopolitical). The system becomes more efficient, but also more exposed.
At 100 years: the question of control
In the long term, the central issue will no longer be production, but control of resources: water, seeds, data, logistics. Food is becoming a global strategic issue.
ESG, futures markets, and financial power: regulating without illusion
ESG has emerged as a major lever for capital allocation in agri-food systems, with global assets exceeding $30 trillion according to the World Bank. By conditioning access to finance on environmental, social, and governance criteria, it introduces real pressure toward transparency, traceability, and more sustainable practices. However, its influence remains indirect: ESG acts on incentives, not on the mechanisms of price formation themselves.
These mechanisms are now deeply structured by financial markets, particularly agricultural futures contracts, historically designed to secure producers’ revenues and buyers’ costs, but which have, since the 2000s, become full-fledged investment assets. On exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade, traded volumes far exceed physical volumes, introducing a new dimension: the price of wheat, maize, or oils reflects not only supply and demand, but also expectations, arbitrage, and global capital flows.
International institutions, notably the OECD, do not point to systematic manipulation, but they acknowledge that these flows can amplify price movements and accelerate shock transmission, with direct effects on net-importing countries. Regulatory tools exist (position limits, strategic reserves, competition frameworks), but they remain fragmented in the face of globalized and concentrated value chains. In this context, ESG appears as a necessary but insufficient tool: it can redirect capital flows, but it does not correct either the concentration of market power or the financialization of agricultural commodities. The question is therefore no longer simply how to regulate better, but how far states and institutions are willing to intervene in a system where food has become simultaneously a vital resource, a financial asset, and an instrument of power.
Conclusion: an organized economy of hunger
The data shows a world capable of producing enough.
But it also reveals a system that is unbalanced, concentrated, and fragile.
The economy of hunger is not an accident.
It is a consequence.
And therefore, potentially, a choice.
Sources
FAO, Cereal Supply and Demand Brief ; Food Outlook (juin et novembre 2025) ; The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025 ; The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2024 ; World Food and Agriculture Statistical Yearbook 2025.
OECD/FAO, Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034.
World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook (April 2025) ; data on cost and affordability of healthy diets.
Eurostat / Commission européenne / EEA, production agricole de l’UE, fruits et légumes, eau et perspectives agricoles.
ICO / ICCO, rapports café et cacao 2025-2026.
UNCTAD / OECD, concentration, traders et pouvoir de marché dans les chaînes alimentaires.
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