Global economy, energy, raw materials, agriculture and financial markets
From price volatility to capacity scarcity
| CENTRAL THESIS Global growth is no longer constrained only by the price of capital. It increasingly depends on the effective availability of energy, grids, refining and processing capacity, agricultural inputs, trade routes and hedging instruments. The decisive scarcity in 2026 is therefore not always the raw resource itself: it is the capacity to convert, transport, finance and insure it. |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The September 2026 outlook can no longer be reduced to a choice between slowdown and resilience. Global growth remains positive (the IMF projects 3.0% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027) but it is becoming more uneven, more capital-intensive and more dependent on a limited number of physical infrastructures. Technology, energy investment, defence and public expenditure continue to support activity; at the same time, disruptions affecting transport, gas, fertilisers, grains and metals are raising the marginal cost of growth. [1]
The most important signal at the start of the new economic season is not a collapse in demand. It is the coexistence of still-robust demand in strategic segments with supply that adjusts only slowly. The euro area provides a clear illustration: flash inflation rose to 3.3% in August while industry remained fragile. In agriculture, the FAO index increased by 1.9% in August to 133.3 points, with every category moving higher. Oil remains subject to a geopolitical and logistical premium: in August, the IEA estimated a third-quarter market deficit of 1.8 million barrels per day, more than twice its July estimate. [2][3][4]
This configuration supports neither a global stagflation scenario nor a rapid return to normality. It requires analysis at three levels: aggregate growth remains resilient; relative prices are shifting sharply across sectors; and the cost of finance, insurance and hedging increasingly determines which actors can absorb volatility. Derivatives markets are therefore not a technical appendix to the real economy: they are becoming part of its continuity infrastructure.
| Block | September signal | Strategic reading |
| Growth | IMF: 3.0% in 2026; 3.4% in 2027 | Aggregate resilience, more uneven quality |
| Euro area | Flash HICP: 3.3% in August | Supply shock difficult to address through rates |
| Oil | IEA: Q3 2026 deficit estimated at 1.8 mb/d | Security of flows matters more than reserves alone |
| Food | FAO: 133.3 points, +1.9% m/m | Broad rise; energy-to-harvest transmission |
| Metals | Copper and refining at the centre of electrification | Processing capacity becomes the scarce asset |
| Finance | Dispersion in rates, premia and hedges | Global liquidity conceals selectivity |
1. GLOBAL MACROECONOMY: POSITIVE GROWTH, BUT INCREASINGLY COSTLY TO DELIVER
Aggregate resilience does not amount to normalisation
The IMF’s July projection (global growth of 3.0% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027) makes a worldwide recession less likely. Yet it does not describe a return to the pre-crisis regime. Growth is increasingly concentrated in economies with competitively priced energy, sufficient financial depth and technology ecosystems capable of converting investment into productivity gains. Global averages therefore conceal widening divergence between energy producers, importing economies, industrial platforms and countries that remain highly sensitive to funding costs. [1]
The defining break in 2026 lies in the nature of the constraints. After a decade dominated by deficient demand and very low interest rates, bottlenecks are increasingly physical: dispatchable power generation, grids, transformers, storage capacity, refineries, rare-earth separation facilities, fertiliser availability and maritime corridors. Lower interest rates can support investment; they cannot instantly build a high-voltage line, a mine or an LNG terminal.
Inflation: the return of relative-price shocks
Inflation in 2026 is not uniform. The rise in euro-area HICP inflation to 3.3% in August, after 2.8% in June, reflects a renewed contribution from energy and food. For a company, the relevant question is not only the average index but the covariance between critical inputs: gas, electricity, freight, metals and finance may tighten simultaneously. [2][5]
| ANALYTICAL POINT An economy may display manageable average inflation while experiencing capacity inflation. When several sectors compete for the same electricity, copper, transformers or port capacity, pressure migrates towards delivery times, contractual premia and hedging costs. |
2. MAJOR ECONOMIC REGIONS
United States: technology, consumption and bond-market discipline
The United States retains four powerful shock absorbers: deep capital markets, domestic energy production, technological leadership and the ability to attract global savings. Investment in AI, data centres, semiconductors and grids supports fixed-capital demand. Yet this technological advantage is itself becoming material: more computing requires more electricity, copper, cooling and grid-connection capacity.
The labour market is normalising without giving an unambiguous signal of a break. JOLTS data show 5.072 million total separations in July, down from 5.337 million in June, while US manufacturing output edged higher in July. Slower labour-market flows and investment concentrated in a limited number of sectors can nevertheless coexist with respectable aggregate growth. [6][7]
The principal US risk is less an immediate debt crisis than a lasting increase in the term premium. Heavy Treasury issuance, combined with private investment needs, intensifies competition for savings. The dollar reduces sovereign liquidity risk, but it does not remove the economic cost of higher interest payments.
Euro area: the cost of dependency and the execution imperative
The euro area remains the region where the gap between strategic ambition and available means is most visible. Decarbonisation, defence, technological autonomy and reindustrialisation simultaneously require energy, grids, critical materials and public capital. The rebound in inflation to 3.3% in August restricts monetary-policy room, while high energy costs continue to weigh on the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. [2]
Europe’s central question is therefore no longer how to define its objectives. It is how to sequence and execute them: shortening grid-connection times, securing long-term contracts, pooling selected investments, accelerating recycling and reducing refining dependencies. Regulatory simplification is valuable only if it releases capital for real investment without weakening the comparability of information.
China: industrial capacity, deflationary pressure and processing power
China remains pivotal not only because it consumes a large share of industrial commodities, but because it dominates many intermediate stages: metals refining, anode and cathode materials, solar equipment, batteries and electrical components. This capability can exert downward pressure on manufactured-goods prices while deepening the strategic dependency of importing countries.
The property slowdown continues to restrain traditional metals demand, but is partly offset by power-grid investment, electric vehicles, clean-technology exports and digital equipment. It would be analytically mistaken to view China solely through its property cycle: its influence on commodities is shifting from construction towards electrification and industrial processing.
Emerging economies: the dollar, food and refinancing
For energy- and food-importing economies, the principal risk is a threefold constraint: the external bill, food inflation and foreign-currency debt service. A moderate rise in world prices can become much larger in local currency when the exchange rate depreciates. Resource exporters may benefit from stronger terms of trade, provided that windfall revenues are converted into productive capacity.
3. ENERGY: FROM THE BARREL TO THE POWER SYSTEM
Oil: a physically tighter market than headline prices may suggest
In August, the IEA raised its estimate of the global oil-market deficit in the third quarter to 1.8 mb/d, from around 0.8 mb/d one month earlier. The central issue is not the spot price alone, but the pace at which Gulf flows are restored, the availability of commercial inventories, accessible spare capacity and the shape of the forward curve. Persistent backwardation (nearby prices above deferred contracts) would indicate a high value attached to immediately available barrels. [4]
The Strait of Hormuz remains a risk multiplier. According to the IEA, around 20 mb/d of oil and nearly one-fifth of global LNG trade passed through it before the crisis. Bypass pipelines provide some capacity but cannot fully replace the maritime route. The economically relevant price therefore includes crude, freight, insurance, delays and precautionary inventories. [8]
Natural gas: European security and the global LNG arbitrage
Gas remains the market in which a regional disruption becomes global most quickly. Europe and Asia compete for flexible cargoes; any interruption affecting the Gulf or a major terminal changes the arbitrage between TTF, JKM and Henry Hub. European storage cushions the shock, but storage levels alone do not measure security: withdrawal rates, terminal capacity, interconnections and industrial demand also matter.
The gas–fertiliser relationship is decisive. Natural gas is both an energy source and a feedstock for ammonia. Prolonged tightness can reduce plant utilisation rates, raise farming costs and transmit the shock to food prices with a lag of several months.
Renewables, grids and storage
The IEA expects renewables to overtake coal as the world’s largest source of electricity in 2026. This historic shift does not solve the system problem. Variable generation must be connected, balanced and complemented by storage, demand flexibility and dispatchable capacity. More than 2,500 GW of projects are awaiting grid connection worldwide: the network is becoming the transition’s true bottleneck. [9][10]
Storage reduces intraday imbalances but shifts dependency towards lithium, graphite, control software and power electronics. Energy sovereignty now consists in mastering a portfolio of interconnected and redundant assets.
4. INDUSTRIAL AND STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS
Copper: the time constraint precedes the geological constraint
Copper concentrates the tensions of the new economy: grids, electric vehicles, data centres, motors, defence and construction compete for the same metal. Under stated policies, the IEA estimates that expected mine supply could fall around 25% short of primary requirements in 2035. This does not imply an automatic shortage today; it means the system must accelerate mining, recycling, substitution and material efficiency. [11]
The principal difficulty is temporal. Higher prices can stimulate exploration, but permitting, financing and construction take years. Regional premia, exchange inventories and smelter treatment charges are therefore as informative as the benchmark price.
Lithium, nickel and cobalt: relative abundance, persistent concentration
These markets illustrate the difference between geological scarcity and industrial concentration. Lithium prices corrected after a rapid supply expansion, while nickel remains shaped by Indonesian capacity growth. Yet lower prices can slow higher-cost projects and strengthen integrated producers. Strategic risk often lies in refining, battery chemistry and industrial qualification rather than extraction alone.
Cobalt retains particular sensitivity to geographic concentration and social standards. The diversification of battery chemistries lowers cobalt and nickel intensity in some applications without eliminating total volume growth. The appropriate indicator is therefore the cathode technology mix as much as electric-vehicle demand.
Graphite, rare earths and semiconductors
Natural and synthetic graphite are essential to anodes; separated rare earths feed permanent magnets, motors, wind turbines and defence systems. Volumes are smaller than for copper or aluminium, but processing capacity is highly concentrated. A trade restriction can therefore have a disproportionate impact, because substitution often requires lengthy technical requalification. Semiconductors add cross-dependencies on energy, ultra-pure gases, lithography equipment and water.
Aluminium, steel and gold
Aluminium is solidified electricity: its cost and carbon intensity depend heavily on the power mix. Regional energy-price differentials determine smelter competitiveness. Iron ore and steel remain linked to China’s cycle, but defence and grid investment support specialised, higher-value segments.
Gold benefits from central-bank demand, reserve diversification, geopolitical risk and fiscal uncertainty. Because it yields no income, it remains sensitive to real interest rates. The most rigorous interpretation is as portfolio insurance whose value increases when the correlation between bonds and risky assets becomes less protective.
5. AGRICULTURE: A BROAD-BASED RISE ACROSS HIGHLY DIFFERENTIATED MARKETS
The FAO release of 4 September provides the most recent signal in this report. The overall index reached 133.3 points in August, up 1.9% month on month and 2.5% year on year, while remaining 16.8% below its March 2022 peak. Every category increased: this breadth is more concerning than an isolated shock, but it does not yet constitute a global food crisis. [3]
Grains: wheat, maize, barley, sorghum and rice
The FAO Cereal Price Index rose 2.2% in August to 116.3 points, its highest level since May 2024. Wheat gained 2.6% on the month and 15.0% year on year amid Black Sea logistical disruption, weaker European crop prospects and a softer dollar. Maize rose 2.5%, supported by yield concerns in the US Corn Belt, European drought, ethanol and feed demand, and disruptions to Ukrainian exports. Barley and sorghum increased by 2.6% and 3.9%, respectively. Rice rose only 0.5%, but remains crucial to food security across Asia and Africa. [3]
These markets should not be aggregated indiscriminately. Wheat is sensitive to Black Sea flows and milling quality; maize links livestock feed, ethanol and US weather; barley depends on feed and malting demand; rice is dominated by export policies and public procurement. Global inventories may appear comfortable while only a limited share is available for export.
Oilseeds and vegetable oils: soybeans, rapeseed, sunflower and palm
The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index reached 196.9 points in August, up 0.6% on the month and its highest level since June 2022. Stronger palm oil, supported by import demand and weather risks in Southeast Asia, together with firm South American soy oil, more than offset lower sunflower and rapeseed quotations. [3]
The boundary between food and energy is becoming less distinct: biodiesel mandates, crude-oil prices and US biofuel policy alter the relative value of vegetable oils. The soybean crush margin is a key indicator of the incentive to process. For Europe, rapeseed and sunflower availability must be read alongside imports, energy costs and Ukrainian flows.
Sugar, coffee and cocoa
Sugar led the increase in food prices in August. It directly connects agriculture and energy, because the Brazilian allocation between sugar and ethanol determines how much cane is available for export. Conditions in India, Thailand and Brazil, blending policies and freight must be monitored together.
Coffee and cocoa require a different approach. Production is concentrated in narrow climatic zones and depends on long biological cycles. For cocoa, West African yields, disease and bean availability determine grinding rates; for coffee, analysis must distinguish arabica from robusta, Brazil from Vietnam, certified inventories and quality differentials. In the absence of a fully comparable institutional September release, this report does not insert an unverifiable point estimate for either market.
Livestock, dairy, cotton, rubber and timber
The FAO Meat Price Index rose 1.0% in August: poultry, pig meat and ovine meat increased, while bovine meat declined. High European temperatures slowed animal growth and reduced the supply of slaughter-ready pigs. Dairy must be analysed by product (butter, powders and cheese) because milk-fat availability, Chinese demand and Oceanian exports produce divergent trajectories. [3]
Cotton is both an agricultural raw material and an indicator of discretionary consumption; its price depends on yields and textile demand. Natural rubber connects Asian weather, the automotive cycle and substitution by synthetics. Timber is more sensitive to construction and mortgage rates. These niches transmit cycles different from those in grains.
Fertilisers: the principal risk multiplier
Nitrogen, phosphate and potash have distinct market structures; nitrogen is most directly exposed to natural gas. The risk is not confined to an immediate price increase: sustained high costs can reduce application rates, affect future yields and turn a temporary energy shock into delayed food inflation.
6. FINANCIAL MARKETS: GLOBAL LIQUIDITY, LOCAL SELECTIVITY
Equities: concentration is not the same as strength
Equity markets remain supported by earnings linked to technology, infrastructure, defence and energy. Yet an index rise driven by a small number of large companies does not imply broad economic improvement. Market breadth, earnings revisions, margins and capital expenditure must complement the reading of headline indices.
AI is creating a powerful investment loop across semiconductors, data centres, grids and software. It is also creating a profitability test: capital expenditure must progressively translate into revenue and productivity. The highest valuations are therefore sensitive both to long-term rates and to evidence of monetisation.
Sovereign bonds and credit
Bond markets are balancing expected disinflation against sovereign issuance needs and the risk of supply shocks. Lower policy rates do not automatically produce an equivalent fall in long-term yields if term premia, deficits or inflation expectations rise. For companies, credit dispersion is more informative than the average spread: issuers exposed to energy, refinancing or critical inputs face increasingly differentiated pricing.
Private debt and open-ended funds require particular attention to liquidity mismatches between assets and liabilities. While redemptions remain modest, valuations may appear stable; under stress, infrequent pricing can conceal rather than eliminate volatility.
Foreign exchange: the dollar remains the pivot
The dollar retains its four functions (transaction currency, reserve asset, funding currency and safe haven) despite gradual reserve diversification. EUR/USD should be read through growth differentials, rate expectations and Europe’s energy bill. Emerging-market currencies add external refinancing risk. BIS data updated on 3 September allow analysts to distinguish a bilateral move against the dollar from a change in the effective exchange rate. [12]
Derivatives: instruments of price discovery and economic continuity
Futures and options perform three functions: price discovery, risk transfer and liquidity allocation. Analysis should not stop at the nearby contract. Forward curves, basis, open interest, implied volatility, skew and variation margins provide information on physical tightness and the price of insurance.
In commodities, the term structure reveals immediate availability; in rates, swaps and futures express the expected path of monetary policy; in foreign exchange, hedging costs can offset part of the return on a foreign asset. The BIS monitors both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives. Central clearing reduces some bilateral risks, but it can also concentrate collateral needs during volatility shocks. [13][14]
| IMPLICATION FOR BUSINESS Hedging should be treated as an operating capability. Hedging 100% at any price can destroy value; leaving everything unhedged can threaten margins or liquidity. The appropriate decision depends on horizon, basis risk, margin terms and the ability to pass costs through. |
7. CROSS-MARKET TRANSMISSION: WHAT MARKETS REVEAL ABOUT THE REAL ECONOMY
| Transmission chain | First-order effect | Second-round effect | Leading indicator |
| Hormuz → energy | Oil/LNG, freight, insurance | Inflation, margins, current account | Transit, stocks, curves |
| Gas → fertilisers | Costlier ammonia/urea | Lower application, future yields | Utilisation, urea prices |
| AI → electricity | Data-centre capex | Copper, grids, cooling | Connections, capex |
| Metals → industry | Component cost and delay | Investment, substitution | Stocks, premia, charges |
| Rates → agriculture | Costlier working capital | Constrained stocks and capex | Credit, basis, margins |
| Volatility → collateral | Margin calls | Liquidity, position reduction | Implied vol, open interest |
The common message is that shocks travel through balance sheets before appearing fully in production volumes. A company may maintain output while committing more working capital; a farmer may keep acreage unchanged but reduce input intensity; an energy producer may own profitable assets yet face substantial margin calls. Liquidity becomes the bridge between financial volatility and real activity.
8. THREE-, SIX- AND TWELVE-MONTH SCENARIOS
These scenarios are not point forecasts. They organise the risks using information available as at 4 September and must be reassessed as new releases become available from the IEA, IMF, central banks and agricultural institutions.
Central scenario: incomplete stabilisation
Over three months, energy flows partially normalise without eliminating the geopolitical premium; food inflation remains firm but does not accelerate uncontrollably. Central banks remain gradual. Over six months, disinflation resumes if gas and grain prices ease, while global growth remains close to the IMF baseline. Over twelve months, infrastructure investment supports activity, but sectoral dispersion remains high.
Stress scenario: synchronised constraints
A renewed energy disruption, combined with poor harvests and wider funding margins, would lift inflation while weakening demand. The tipping point would not be a single price, but the simultaneous appearance of several signals: steep oil backwardation, high European gas prices, dearer fertilisers, rising grains and wider credit spreads.
Favourable scenario: physical easing and productivity gains
A faster restoration of Gulf flows, good harvests, accelerated grid connections and wider diffusion of AI productivity gains would permit disinflation without recession. Long-term rates could nevertheless remain above the levels of the 2010s because of substantial public- and private-investment needs.
9. MONITORING DASHBOARD: SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 2026
| Indicator | Why it matters | Favourable signal | Risk signal |
| Hormuz transit | Physical normalisation | Regular flows | New interruptions |
| Brent/TTF curves | Near-term vs future tightness | Orderly flattening | Abrupt backwardation |
| FAO grains/oils | Food transmission | Monthly deceleration | Persistent broad rise |
| Gas/urea | Future yield costs | Joint decline | Urea rises |
| Copper stocks/premia | Physical availability | Contained premia | Low stocks, strong premia |
| Core/energy inflation | Nature of shock | Broad disinflation | Second-round services effect |
| Long yields/spreads | Cost of capital | Stability | Both rise |
| Volatility/margins | Liquidity risk | Stable collateral | Cascading calls |
CONCLUSION: ECONOMIC POWER IS INCREASINGLY DEFINED BY CONVERSION CAPACITY
September 2026 confirms that the strategic question is no longer simply: who owns the resources? It is becoming: who can convert them into available energy, qualified materials, affordable food and financeable assets? That conversion requires infrastructure, skills, contracts, data and liquidity.
For public policy, the priority is to reduce delays and critical dependencies without replacing one vulnerability with another. For the private sector, it is to map second-order exposures: not only the direct supplier, but also that supplier’s energy, inputs, trade corridor, currency and collateral requirements. For investors, selection must distinguish companies that merely benefit from a theme from those that genuinely possess the assets, technology and balance-sheet capacity to execute it.
| GUIDING IDEA Resilience in 2026 does not mean the absence of shocks. It means the ability to absorb their cost without interrupting investment. In this economy, redundancy, storage, grids, refining and hedging cease to be overheads: they become productive assets. |
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
Time scope: data published and accessible as at 4 September 2026. Figures are dated by reference period. Forecasts are attributed to the relevant institution and publication. The report’s own forward-looking assessments are presented as conditional scenarios, not certainties.
Source hierarchy: international institutions, central banks, statistical agencies and official sector bodies. Unsourced market commentary has been excluded. Where recent comparable data were unavailable, particularly for certain agricultural niches, the analysis remains structural and does not provide a point estimate.
[1] IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO
[2] ECB Data Portal, euro-area inflation, August 2026. https://data.ecb.europa.eu/
[3] FAO, Food Price Index, 4 September 2026. https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/
[4] IEA, Oil Market Report, August 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-august-2026
[5] ECB, Economic Bulletin 5/2026. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/html/eb202605.en.html
[6] BLS/FRED, Total Separations, July 2026. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSTSL
[7] Federal Reserve/FRED, Industrial Production: Manufacturing. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPMANSICS
[8] IEA, Strait of Hormuz. https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz
[9] IEA, Electricity Mid-Year Update 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-mid-year-update-2026
[10] IEA, Electricity 2026 – Grids. https://www.iea.org/reports/electricity-2026/grids
[11] IEA, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026
[12] BIS, foreign-exchange statistics. https://data.bis.org/topics/XRU
[13] BIS, exchange-traded derivatives. https://data.bis.org/topics/XTD_DER
[14] BIS, OTC derivatives. https://data.bis.org/topics/OTC_DER
[15] World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook. https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets
[16] EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/
[17] OPEC, Monthly Oil Market Report. https://www.opec.org/monthly-oil-market-report.html
[18] USDA, WASDE. https://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity-markets/wasde
[19] AMIS, Market Monitor. https://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-monitoring/monthly-report/en/
[20] Eurostat, Euro indicators. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/news/euro-indicators
[21] Federal Reserve, FOMC. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm
[22] ECB, monetary-policy decisions. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/govcdec/mopo/html/index.en.html
[23] USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026. https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/mineral-commodity-summaries
[24] IRENA, publications. https://www.irena.org/Publications
[25] UNCTAD, maritime transport. https://unctad.org/topic/transport-and-trade-logistics/review-of-maritime-transport
[26] WTO, trade statistics. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm
[27] SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
[28] IFRS Foundation, ISSB. https://www.ifrs.org/groups/international-sustainability-standards-board/
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